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INTRODUCTION
At 24 years old, Timothy finally caught a break.1 After two years of
rejections from veterinary schools, Timothy was admitted to the Doctor of
Veterinary Medicine program at a university in a nearby state.2 Of course,
the prospect of hundreds of thousands of dollars of student loans covering
Timothy’s out-of-state tuition tempered his excitement.3 Timothy,
however, received additional good news soon after starting his first
semester: his sister-in-law had given birth. As a new uncle, Timothy
wanted nothing more than to meet his nephew back home. Encouraged by
decent grades, Timothy was confident he could afford a small break from
his incessant studies to return home.
While driving home, Timothy’s car violently swerved off the rural
highway and crashed into a tree. The crushing impact broke his back,
leaving him paralyzed from the waist down for the rest of his life.
Timothy’s meager insurance policy only covered a fraction of his medical
expenses, and without some form of financial recovery, Timothy could not
afford to finish veterinary school. A post-crash analysis revealed that the
car’s multipiece wheel was incompatible with the tire surrounding it,
1. The defective product in this hypothetical scenario comes from the facts
of Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1992).
2. See Lori Hehn, How Hard is it to Get Into Veterinary School? A Look at
the Acceptance Rate, VETPREP BLOG (Sept. 10, 2019, 5:29 PM), https://blog.vet
prep.com/how-hard-is-it-to-get-into-veterinary-school-a-look-at-acceptance-therate (estimating national average acceptance rate of veterinary schools at 11.7%)
[https://perma.cc/2KQ3-26M9].
3. See Media Frequently Asked Questions, ASS’N AM. VETERINARY MED.
CS., https://www.aavmc.org/media-faqs.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2019)
(estimating median annual tuition for out-of-state veterinary students at $50,123
for four-year programs) [https://perma.cc/M5VT-ZE4J].
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causing an explosive separation of the two parts.4 After filing suit against
Manufacturer A, the manufacturer of the multipiece wheel, Timothy
learned that an influx of claims like his had bankrupted the company.
Timothy, consequently, had no hope of recovering substantial damages
from Manufacturer A. Luckily, he later learned that Manufacturer B, the
tire manufacturer, knew of its product’s incompatibility with the car’s
multipiece wheel, yet never warned about the potential danger of
integrating its tire with the wheel, despite a well-known tendency to use
them together. With a second chance at recovery in hand, Timothy’s dream
of becoming a veterinarian stays alive.
Whether Timothy and other similarly-situated plaintiffs can recover
from manufacturers largely depends on whether courts can hold one
manufacturer liable for failing to warn about the dangers of a product that
is used in combination with its own but that is created by another
company.5 Put more theoretically, the question becomes whether
Manufacturer B’s duty to warn about the risks of using its tires
encompasses warning about the risks that Manufacturer A’s wheels pose
to consumers when used in conjunction or integrated with B’s product.6
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Air and Liquid
Systems Corp. v. DeVries addressed this question in the context of
maritime law.7 The Court articulated the scope of a product manufacturer’s
duty to warn in the integrated-product setting described above as follows:
a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product
requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be
dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no
reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that danger.8
4. See OSHA Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.177(b) (2011) (“Servicing multipiece and single piece rim wheels”).
5. A claim premised on a defect in the product’s warning or instructions is
not the only possible grounds for liability in Timothy’s case. The tire
manufacturer may have defectively designed the injurious product, and Timothy
may have a defective-design claim against the tire manufacturer. See 1 DAVID G.
OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:1 (4th ed.
2019), Westlaw. This Comment exclusively examines alleged defects in a
product’s warning material, not its design.
6. See generally In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232,
236 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that some courts conceptualize the issue of the thirdparty duty to warn in terms of the duty element of a negligence claim).
7. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 995 (2019).
8. Id. at 996.
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Under this standard, Timothy may recover if (i) the tire required
incorporation of the multipiece wheel; (ii) the tire manufacturer knew or
should have known of the danger of using its product as intended in
conjunction with the multipiece wheel; and (iii) the manufacturer had no
reason to believe its product’s users would become aware of that danger.9
Notably, however, the Court asserted, “We do not purport to define the
proper tort rule outside the maritime context.”10 Thus, the standard
governing claims like Timothy’s remains unsettled.
Outside the maritime context, courts disagree on the appropriate
standard governing a manufacturer’s duty to warn about the dangers of
third-party products used with the manufacturer’s own product.11 Some
courts outright deny any such duty,12 others equate it to the uncontroversial
duty to warn against the dangers of one’s own products,13 and the rest fall
somewhere in the middle.14 DeVries reinvigorated the debate between
courts that endorsed one or another of these conflicting approaches
because much of the Supreme Court’s reasoning is applicable in nonmaritime contexts.15 Essentially, DeVries brought the issue of the thirdparty duty to warn to the fore, with a new dynamic that courts must wrestle
with moving forward.16 Although the DeVries decision resolved the
9. Id.
10. Id. at 995.
11. See cases cited infra notes 12–14.
12. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005);
Evans v. CBS Corp., 230 F. Supp. 3d 397, 403–05 (D. Del. 2017); DeVries v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458–59 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Cabasug v. Crane
Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1041 (D. Haw. 2013); O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d
987 (Cal. 2012); Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008);
Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127 (Wash. 2008).
13. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232 (3d
Cir. 2017); Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, No. 14-CV-29-SMY-SCW, 2015
WL 5584749 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 035126, 2004 WL 2250990 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson
Co., 373 P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
14. See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 986; Quirin v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig.,
59 N.E.3d 458 (N.Y. 2016); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984 (Md.
2015).
15. See Kenneth Bradley, Attorneys offer views on high court’s ‘bare-metal
defense’ asbestos ruling, 41 No. 22 WESTLAW J. ASBESTOS 05 (Aug. 15, 2019)
(“But the reasoning underlying the [DeVries] decision is persuasive for cases that
are land-based as well.”).
16. See Yaw v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., CASE NO. C18-5405 BHS, 2019
WL 1755299, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2019) (deferring consideration of
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question of the third-party duty to warn in the maritime context, courts
grappling with the same question in non-maritime contexts are revisiting
their past precedent in light of the Supreme Court’s new decision.17
Courts ought to formulate a rule that falls between a denial of the thirdparty duty to warn and an imposition of such a duty for every foreseeable
risk associated with third-party products that will be used with the
manufacturer’s own product.18 A manufacturer should have a duty to warn
against the dangers of third-party products used in conjunction with its
own when: (1) its product will inevitably be used together with a thirdparty part or product such that the conjoined use cannot be avoided as a
result of the product’s design, the manufacturer’s instructions, or the
absence of economically feasible alternative means of enabling the
product to function as intended; (2) the product manufacturer knows or
should know that the intended combined use of the products is likely to be
dangerous; and (3) the product manufacturer knows or should know that
the product’s users will not anticipate that danger.19 An apt name for this
standard is the “inevitability approach.”20
The inevitability approach is ideal for a number of reasons. First, it is
fair. It does not hold manufacturers accountable for risks they cannot
anticipate.21 Second, the inevitability approach comports with the sound
public policy of allocating liability efficiently, as the manufacturer that is
best equipped to cost-effectively protect against the risk that its product
poses to consumers bears the burden of implementing those protections.22
Finally, the proposed rule improves upon DeVries’ third condition, which
implies that if a manufacturer has any reason to believe that a product’s
users will realize the dangers associated with that product, then that
defendant-manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment until after filing
supplemental briefing on how DeVries may impact causation and the failure-towarn analysis).
17. See Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3-CV,
2019 WL 3287067, at *13–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2019) (analyzing the thirdparty duty to warn in light of DeVries and other state-specific precedent).
18. See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 996.
19. See generally Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d 760; In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59
N.E.3d 458; May, 129 A.3d 984.
20. See discussion infra Part III.C.
21. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995 (finding that
manufacturers will know when a warning is required because they will know
when their product requires a part in order to function as intended).
22. See generally id. at 994 (arguing that a product manufacturer often stands
in a better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the dangers of the
combined product).
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manufacturer has no duty to warn of such dangers.23 This condition allows
manufacturers to hide behind other manufacturers’ warnings so as to avoid
liability, but the third condition of the inevitability standard prevents such
behavior.24
Part I of this Comment will discuss the general duty to warn in
products liability cases, presenting the duty’s history and development
over the years. Part I will continue to introduce some of the different
factual contexts in which the question arises of whether the scope of a
manufacturer’s duty to warn encompasses the dangers associated with a
third-party product, including when a product’s intended use involves
conjunction or integration with another product, such as replacement parts,
component parts, or asbestos-containing materials. Next, Part II will
survey the different approaches that courts have taken to the third-party
duty to warn, with an emphasis on the underlying disagreements between
each. Subsequently, Part III will argue that among the three frontrunners
in the debate over the duty to warn against the dangers of third-party
products, the middle-ground approach of the inevitability standard is best.
This Part will demonstrate how the inevitability standard enjoys all of the
legal and policy-based upsides of the other approaches with fewer
downsides. Part IV will conclude by reiterating the advantages that courts
stand to gain by adopting the proposed inevitability standard.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY DUTY TO WARN
Whether manufacturers have a third-party duty to warn is really a
question about manufacturers’ general duty to warn about the risks
inherent in their own products.25 This generic duty to warn traces its roots
back to Roman law but underwent significant development in the 20th
century.26
A. History of the Duty to Warn
In the earliest American products-liability cases involving the duty to
warn, courts held sellers liable for failing to disclose defects in the goods

23. See id. at 996 (“[A]nd (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that
the product’s users will realize that danger.”).
24. See Alani Golanski, When Sellers of “Safe” Products Turn Ostrich in
Relation to Dangerous Post-Sale Components, 39 SW. L. REV. 69 (2009).
25. See generally In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232,
236 (3d Cir. 2017).
26. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.1 (2d ed. 2008).
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that buyers purchased.27 For example, after a buyer discovered that he had
purchased diseased sheep, a New York court found the seller liable for
neglecting to inform the buyer of the disease.28 Other courts held sellers
liable when a buyer purchased cow feed tainted with lead paint29 and when
a carpenter made a stepladder from defective wood.30 These cases
premised liability on a mix of false-representation and deceit theories, as
the ancient Roman notion of dolus—or fraud through the concealment of
a defect—still dominated judicial approaches.31 In these early productsliability cases, privity32 was a prerequisite to recovery because of courts’
fixation on the misrepresentation made by the seller to the buyer.33 It was
not until Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co.34 that parties who were
not in privity could recover from manufacturers for injuries caused by
defective products.35 In Huset, a laborer hired to assist his employer
operate a threshing machine brought a products-liability claim against the
thresher manufacturer after the machine crushed his leg.36 The
manufacturer designed the thresher’s protective covering to support an
adult, yet it collapsed under the plaintiff’s weight.37 The court adopted the
principle that a manufacturer that supplies an imminently dangerous
machine without warning about its risks is liable to anyone who sustains
injury as a result of the dangerous condition of the machine, regardless of
the parties’ privity or lack thereof.38
Today, the standard formulation of the duty to warn is that a
manufacturer is liable for failing to warn or inadequately warning about
both the hazards inherent in the intended use of its product and the risks

27. See cases cited infra notes 28–30.
28. Jeffrey v. Bigelow & Tracy, 13 Wend. 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
29. French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132 (1869).
30. Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 51 N.W. 1103 (Minn. 1892).
31. A. Rogerson, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects in Roman and
English Law, in STUDIES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 112, 113 (Daube ed. 1959).
32. “The connection or relationship between two parties, each having a
legally recognized interest in the same subject matter (such as a transaction,
proceeding, or piece of property); mutuality of interest <privity of contract>.”
Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.
33. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.1; cf. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916).
34. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
35. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.1.
36. Huset, 120 F. at 872–73.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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associated with the reasonably foreseeable uses of the product it sells.39
This duty to warn encompasses two sub-duties: (1) the sub-duty to warn
about the hidden dangers in a product and (2) the sub-duty to instruct
buyers on how to safely use the product.40 Mandating compliance with
these two sub-duties ensures that the manufacturer that knows of the risks
in its product will exercise reasonable care to transmit that knowledge to
the consumer, who is ignorant of the product’s risks and susceptible to
serious harm as a result of such ignorance.41
As authority for the duty to warn, some courts in the late 20th century
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388.42 Section 388 suggests
holding manufacturers liable for physical harm caused by the intended use
of their products when three conditions are met: (1) the manufacturer knew
or should have known that the product is dangerous in some way; (2) the
manufacturer had no reason to believe that the product’s user would realize
the danger inherent in the product; and (3) the manufacturer failed to
exercise reasonable care to inform that user of the danger.43 Confusingly,
other courts seeking to understand the duty to warn sought guidance from

39. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 96 (5th ed. 1984). Retail sellers and product suppliers also have a duty
to warn buyers of product dangers. See Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d
806 (Ind. 2007). This Comment focuses exclusively on the duty to warn with
respect to manufacturers, not sellers or suppliers.
40. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.1.
41. Id.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see,
e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965) (quoting
§ 388 in jury instructions in the context of a failure-to-warn claim).
Restatement § 388 reads as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to
use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its
probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the
manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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a different section of the same Restatement—§ 402A.44 Section 402A
recommends imposing liability on manufacturers for selling defective
products that are unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer,
regardless of the level of care and precaution taken in the manufacturing
of the product.45
The inconsistency between these two sections exists because they both
appear in the “Negligence” division of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
but § 402A really creates strict liability and falls under the “Strict
Liability” heading of the section, thereby creating ambiguity as to whether
a breach of the duty to warn falls under negligence, strict liability, or
both.46 Modern products-liability litigation reflects this discrepancy, as
plaintiffs can allege either negligence or strict liability as two different
causes of action that each independently support their failure-to-warn
claims.47 Restatement § 388’s language links the duty to warn to the typical

Id.

44. Id. at § 402A. Restatement § 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.

45. Id.
46. Id. at §§ 388, 402A. Strict liability differs from negligence in that it is a
form of liability without fault, such that in a strict-liability analysis the only issue
is whether the product poses an unreasonable risk of harm, whereas plaintiffs in
negligence actions must prove a failure to exercise reasonable care. FRANK L.
MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 14.01 (perm.
Ed., rev. vol. 2013). Part 2(a) of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
reflects this difference, as a manufacturer might still be liable despite exercising
all possible care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW. INST.
1965).
47. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2; see, e.g., Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d
758 (Ky. 2004) (pleading negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in
failure-to-warn contexts). Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is
another suitable cause of action underlying warning-defect claims, but plaintiffs
assert it less often than negligence or strict liability. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2.
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tort law standard of negligence.48 After the promulgation of § 402A in
1962, however, courts across the country began adopting strict liability for
harms caused by defective products.49 One way a product qualifies as
defective is through inadequate or non-existent warnings.50 The liability is
strict because manufacturers are held liable even if they neither knew nor
should have known of the risk at issue, provided their product was
defective or unreasonably dangerous.51 Thus, either approach, negligence
or strict liability, could apply to a failure-to-warn claim because a
manufacturer that fails to warn of a product’s hazards both breaches its
duty to exercise reasonable care and creates a defective product.52
Despite the discrepancy between the theories of recovery available to
a plaintiff injured as the result of a warning defect, courts analyze failureto-warn claims based in negligence or strict liability nearly identically.53
As the Ohio Supreme Court explained, “Commentators and courts have
long recognized that both approaches deal with the same question of
foreseeability of harm, and are therefore ‘two sides of the same
standard.’”54 The convergence of negligence and strict liability in the
context of the duty to warn is the result of courts importing the typical
negligence concepts of foreseeability and reasonableness into the strictliability inquiry of whether or not a product was defective.55 In other
words, courts concluded that a product is not defective unless the
48. OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2.
49. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793–94 (1966) (characterizing the adoption of
strict liability as “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an
established rule in the entire history of the law of torts”).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW
INST. 1998).
51. See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV.
LITIG. 955, 975 (2007).
52. See id.
53. Douglas R. Richmond, Renewed Look at the Duty to Warn and
Affirmative Defenses, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 205, 207 (1994); OWEN, supra note 26,
§ 9.2; see, e.g., Woeste v. Wa. Platform Saloon & Rest., 836 N.E.2d 52, 55–56
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“The standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict
liability claim grounded upon an inadequate warning is the same as that imposed
in a negligence claim based upon inadequate warning.”).
54. Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (Ohio 1990)
(quoting Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973));
see also George W. Flynn & John J. Laravuso, The Existence of a Duty to Warn:
A Question for the Court or the Jury?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 634
(2000).
55. Owen, supra note 51, at 981–82.
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manufacturer fails to warn against foreseeable risks only, rather than all
risks regardless of the manufacturer’s awareness of them.56 Consequently,
the defectiveness inquiry—a relic of the strict liability standard under
§ 402A—proved to be a negligence standard disguised under another
moniker.57
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability continued the
trend of converging negligence and strict liability by situating the
negligence principles of foreseeability and reasonableness in a standard
that uses the strict liability language of defectiveness:
A product:
.

.

.

(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable
instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe.58
When applying this provision, courts continue to use the language of
strict liability in failure-to-warn contexts.59 Some even insist that liability
for failure to warn is still strict, despite engaging in a negligence analysis
before determining liability.60 Notwithstanding the label of strict liability,
failure-to-warn claims are really negligence claims, with a focus on the
foreseeability of the product’s risks.61
The heart of the negligence analysis for failure-to-warn claims is the
notion of an adequate warning.62 An adequate warning is one that provides
in a reasonable manner to the appropriate individuals information
sufficient to warn about foreseeable risks that are significant enough to

56. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
57. See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict”
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 755–61 (1996).
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998) (emphasis added).
59. See OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2.
60. See id.
61. Owen, supra note 57, at 755–61.
62. See OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2–.3.
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justify the costs of providing the warning information.63 Faced with this
formulation of the duty to warn, one question that courts encounter is
whether the risks at issue include only those presented by a manufacturer’s
own products or, in addition, those associated with a third-party product
that is incorporated into or used in conjunction with the manufacturer’s
product.64 In other words, courts must decide whether manufacturers have
a third-party duty to warn alongside the generic first-party duty to warn
about their own products.65
B. The Third-Party Duty to Warn
Whether a manufacturer has a first-party duty to warn about a given
risk turns on the foreseeability of that risk.66 For instance, if Manufacturer
A distributes a product that, when paired with Manufacturer B’s product,
creates a risk that is foreseeable to A, then A has a duty to warn against
that risk.67 The conclusion that A must warn against the risk, however,
depends upon the assumption that it is A’s product—not B’s—that
contains the risk. Without this assumption, A has no responsibility to warn
against this risk.68 If, alternatively, the risk inheres in Manufacturer B’s
product, then Manufacturer B ought to carry the burden of warning.69
Thus, the manufacturer that creates the product that poses a risk to
consumers must warn about that risk.70 This line of reasoning comports
with the well-recognized principle that a manufacturer’s duty to warn
ushers only from the characteristics of its own products, not from other
manufacturers’ products.71
63. See id. As noted in Part II of this Comment, this commonplace approach
to the duty to warn is known as the “foreseeability approach.” See discussion infra
Part II.
64. See, e.g., Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3CV, 2019 WL 3287067 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2019).
65. See, e.g., id.
66. See OWEN, supra note 26, § 9.2–.3.
67. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 96.
68. See RICHARD E. KAYE, AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D § 32:9 (August 2019),
Westlaw.
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398
(Ct. App. 1985).
71. See KAYE, supra note 68, § 32:9; In re Darvocet, Darvon &
Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ky. 2012).
Courts justify this denial of a third-party duty to warn in a number of different
ways. See In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 236 (3d
Cir. 2017) (speaking in terms of the “bare metal defense,” which provides that
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Despite the frequency with which courts invoke the principle that a
manufacturer’s duty to warn depends only upon its own product’s
characteristics, there are a number of contexts in which courts address the
question of whether a manufacturer is liable for failing to warn about a
third-party product’s risks.72 Some common contexts in which these cases
arise include: (1) when completed products are used in conjunction with
one another;73 (2) when a third-party manufacturer outfits an incomplete
product with component parts post-sale;74 (3) when new parts replace old
ones;75 and (4) when a manufacturer creates a “bare-metal” product, which
is one without necessary insulation or packing that is added on at a later
time, either by the bare-metal manufacturer itself or a third-party such as
another manufacturer or buyer.76
1. Products Used in Conjunction With One Another
The question of the third-party duty to warn commonly arises in cases
where one completed product is integrated with or used alongside another
finished product.77 For example, in Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the plaintiff’s husband was inflating a tire manufactured by Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company (“Goodyear”).78 The tire was mounted on a
multipiece tire rim manufactured by Kelsey-Hayes when the rim exploded
from the tire, striking the plaintiff’s husband in the head and killing him
instantly.79 The plaintiff sued Goodyear, among other manufacturers,
alleging that the tire was designed for installation on a multipiece rim, that
manufacturers who make bare products without insulation or other materials are
immune from liability for the dangers of that material which is added to the
product post-sale). One common justification for the defense centers on the
causation element of a negligence claim, because arguably if a third-party
manufacturer’s product creates the risk in question, then the plaintiff will be
unable to prove that the defendant-manufacturer’s product caused her injuries. See
id. Other courts insist that a manufacturer’s duty only encompasses warnings
about the risks associated with its own products, and so the analysis ends before
causation becomes relevant. Id.
72. See OWEN, supra note 26, § 10:9; see also id. § 10:9 n.151; KAYE, supra
note 68, § 32:9.
73. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
74. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
75. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
76. See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
77. See cases cited infra notes 78, 86, 94, 98.
78. Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 223 (N.Y.
1992).
79. Id.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 233

12/2/20 7:03 AM

230

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Goodyear was aware of the inherent dangers of using the tire in
conjunction with such rims, and that Goodyear failed to warn of the
dangers of using the tire in its intended way.80 The Goodyear tire model in
question was compatible for use on some, but not all, multipiece rim
assemblies.81 The plaintiff conceded that the rim contained the defect that
caused the explosion and that the tire was not defective in any way besides
failing to display a warning of the dangers of its use alongside multipiece
rims.82 Thus, the issue before the court was whether one manufacturer,
Goodyear, was liable for failing to warn when its product was compatible
for use with a defective product made by another manufacturer, KelseyHayes.83 The New York Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer of a
sound product has no duty to warn about a defective product that someone
else manufactured and that is compatible for use with the sound product
because the former manufacturer had no control over the production of the
defective product, played no part in placing that product into the stream of
commerce, and derived no benefit from its sale.84
The Rastelli court distinguished the case from instances where
combining one sound product with another sound product creates a
dangerous condition about which the manufacturer of each product has a
duty to warn, as in Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp.85 Karen M. Ilosky had her
car outfitted with a set of radial tires on the front axle from Michelin Tire
Corporation (“Michelin”) and a set of snow tires on the rear axle from
Ferguson Tire Service Company.86 The industry consensus recommended
against using two different types of tires at the same time.87 The mixing of
different tire types allegedly resulted in oversteering, causing the
plaintiff’s car to spin out of control when navigating a curve in the
highway and crash into a utility pole.88 Ilosky sustained severe injuries and
subsequently filed suit against Michelin for failing to warn about the

80. Id. at 225. The spouse of the decedent brought suit on his behalf. Id.
81. Id. at 223.
82. Id. at 226.
83. Id. Besides Goodyear, the plaintiff sued the three manufacturers of almost
all multipiece tire rims produced in the United States: Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company, Kelsey-Hayes Company, and the Budd Company. Id. at 223. KelseyHayes’ initials appeared on the rim base of the wheel that killed the plaintiff’s
husband. Id.
84. Id. at 226.
85. Id.; Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W.Va. 1983).
86. Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d. at 607.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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dangers of using different types of tires on one vehicle.89 Ilosky’s
allegations were that it was foreseeable that radial tires and snow tires
would be dangerous when paired together and that both manufacturers,
therefore, should have warned against using the tires together.90 Unlike in
Rastelli, the West Virginia court held that the jury was entitled to find that
Michelin had breached its duty to warn of the dangers of mixing its own
tires with tires made by other manufacturers in the manner done in the
case, because such mixing was foreseeable given the industry practice of
advising against mixing radial and conventional tires.91
In light of the holdings from Rastelli and Ilosky, the well-cited
principle that a manufacturer’s duty to warn depends solely upon its own
product’s characteristics appears oversimplified.92 Michelin’s duty to
warn against the dangers of mixing its tires with others depended at least
in part on the qualities of third-party products, because the other, nonMichelin tires must have also been incompatible with Michelin’s tires to
trigger the duty to warn.93 Furthermore, the Rastelli court’s reasoning
implies that if a manufacturer had sufficient control over the third-party
product at issue, played a role in placing the product in the stream of
commerce, and derived a benefit from its sale, then a duty to warn against
that third-party product’s risks might arise.94 Thus, the principle that
manufacturers considering their obligations to warn need look only to their
own products in a vacuum conflicts with the holdings in cases like Rastelli
and Ilosky, among others.95
Admittedly, these two cases acknowledge a very limited third-party
duty to warn.96 Ilosky involved a situation in which two products interacted
synergistically to produce a risk that neither posed on its own, and Rastelli
implied, as a prerequisite to the third-party duty to warn, a high degree of
89. Id. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff could have brought the same
warning claim against the manufacturer of the conventional tires. Id.
90. Id. at 609. While the conventional snow tires were not a sufficient
condition of the defect, neither were Michelin’s radial tires, and therefore it is fair
to characterize the risk as partly created by a third-party product from Michelin’s
point of view. Id.
91. Id. at 610–12.
92. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 96; see also Rastelli v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1992); Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d 603.
93. Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d at 612.
94. Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d at 226.
95. Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d 603; see also Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 701
N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 2000); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 456 (Pa.
1992); Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 517 N.E.2d 1304, 1305 (N.Y. 1987);
Bich v. Gen. Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
96. See Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d 222; Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d 603.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 235

12/2/20 7:03 AM

232

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

control over another manufacturer’s product.97 A more prevalent thirdparty duty to warn would arise in cases where one product poses a risk
independently of the other product and where neither manufacturer
exercises any control over the other—their products intersect through
market forces, for example.
Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. is such a case.98 A man changing out
propane gas tanks on a barbecue grill died in an explosion as a result of a
defect in one of the tanks, and the decedent’s survivors sued the grill
manufacturer, among other companies.99 The question before the New
York Supreme Court was whether the grill manufacturer’s warning to use
the grill outdoors or in well-ventilated areas was adequate to warn against
the dangers presented by defects in the gas tanks.100 The court held that the
grill manufacturer had a duty to warn against the defect of gas tanks
because the grill could not be used without such tanks and its own
warnings to use the product outdoors acknowledged the dangers of gas
emission.101
Notably, in contrast to the Rastelli court’s reasoning that one
manufacturer cannot be responsible for another manufacturer’s product
without some control by the former over the latter, the Rogers court
ignored the business relationship between the grill and propane
manufacturers.102 Instead, the court focused on an attribute of the grill
itself—the product that on its own posed no threat of explosion to the
decedent.103 The relevant attribute was the grill’s inability to function
without the propane gas tank—the defective product that presented the risk
of explosion on its own.104 Thus, rather than decide the issue of the thirdparty duty to warn based on which manufacturer is more responsible for
the risk that befell the decedent—undoubtedly, the propane tank
manufacturer—the Rogers court found dispositive the grill manufacturer’s

97. Ilosky, 307 S.E.2d 603; Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d 222. For more examples of
cases in which two products used together create a risk that neither poses alone,
see James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers of Safe Products Should Not Be Required to
Rescue Users from Risks Presented by Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 SW.
U. L. REV. 595, 600 n.21 (2008).
98. Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 701 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 2000).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 360.
101. Id.
102. See Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d at 226; Rogers, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
103. See Rogers, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
104. See id.
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knowledge of the “danger of gas emission” and its product’s inevitable use
alongside that danger.105
The above examples are only a handful of the many cases that raise
the question of a third-party duty to warn in the context of products used
together.106 Other notable examples include whether the airplane
manufacturer Boeing had a duty to warn about the risks of developing deep
vein thrombosis from using seats made by a third-party and installed in
their aircrafts post-sale107 and whether an above-ground swimming pool
manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn about the dangers of a
defective ladder made by another company and used to enter and exit the
pool.108 These cases present instances of different products used in
conjunction with one another, one of several contexts in which courts often
encounter the issue of the third-party duty to warn.109
2. Component Parts
The question of whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn about risks
posed by third-party products arises in another subset of products liability

105. Id.
106. For other examples of courts addressing the question of the third-party
duty to warn in the context of products used in conjunction with one another, see
Dreyer v. Exel Indus., S.A., No. 08–1854, 2009 WL 1184846 (6th Cir. 2009)
(manufacturer of paint sprayer had no duty to warn of dangers of fire caused by
solvent used to clean the sprayer); Donnelly v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., NO. CIV–
91–1046–W, 1992 WL 208016, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 1992) (gasoline pump
manufacturer had no duty to warn against dangers of gasoline and gasoline
containers made by others); Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc., 173 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct.
App. 1981) (a stove manufacturer had no duty to warn about the dangers of
igniting gas leaking from somewhere besides the stove); Brown v. Drake-Willock
Int’l., Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (dialysis machine
manufacturer had no duty to warn against the hazards of using formaldehyde as a
cleaner despite recommending as much to consumers); Spaulding v. Lesco Int’l.
Corp., 451 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (above-ground pool installer had
no duty to warn of the alleged dangers of another’s product); Tortoriello v. Bally
Case, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1994) (a walk-in freezer manufacturer
had no duty to warn about slipping on the tile of the flooring in the freezer unit
installed by another company); Walton v. Harnischfeger, 796 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990) (crane manufacturer had no duty to warn about the risks of using
a third-party nylon strap with its machinery).
107. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
108. Kaloz v. Risco, 466 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1983).
109. See cases cited supra notes 78, 86, 98.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 237

12/2/20 7:03 AM

234

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

cases, namely, those involving manufacturers of component parts.110 For
example, in Walton v. Avco Corp., the dispute before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concerned a defective engine in the helicopter in which
Dennis McCracken and Billy Tincher were riding.111 The engine seized
mid-flight, causing the aircraft to crash and kill both individuals.112 The
decedents’ administrators sued the engine manufacturer for selling a
defective product, but they also sued the helicopter manufacturer for
failing to warn of the dangers of the engine.113 The court found that the
helicopter manufacturer had a duty to warn that derived from its
knowledge of the defect in the engine, as the engine manufacturer had
published several service instructions and bulletins that announced the
engine defect and recommended modifications to fix it.114
By contrast, in Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., a Massachusetts court
considered the question of the third-party duty to warn from the
perspective of a distributor of component parts.115 Specifically, the
question before the court was whether the manufacturer of a motor lift that
gets incorporated into scaffolding equipment has a duty to warn about the
dangers of improperly rigging the scaffolding.116 The court held that the
manufacturer of the motor lift had no duty to warn of a risk that a third110. See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (AM. LAW
INST. 1998) (“Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product
Components for Harm Caused by Products Into Which Components Are
Integrated”). This section of the Restatement sets out what is known as the
“component parts doctrine,” which provides that a component parts manufacturer
is liable for harm caused by the product into which the component is integrated if
the component itself is defective and the defect causes the harm, or if the
component manufacturer substantially participates in the integration of the
component into the design of the product, the integration causes the product to be
defective, and the defect causes the harm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). From the perspective of the
component manufacturer, then, there is no third-party duty to warn unless that
manufacturer plays a substantial enough role in overseeing the integration of its
components with the third-party product. From the product manufacturer’s
perspective, see E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Products Liability: Manufacturer’s
responsibility for defective component supplied by another and incorporated in
product, 3 A.L.R. 3d 1016 (1965).
111. Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 456 (Pa. 1992).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 457.
114. Id. at 459–60.
115. Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374 (Mass. 1986).
116. Id. at 1375.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 238

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

235

party created and that no one associated with a foreseeable use or misuse
of the manufacturer’s own product.117 In a more recent case, Pantazis v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., a Massachusetts appellate court reaffirmed Mitchell by
holding that a manufacturer of a component part has no duty to warn of
risks presented by an assembled product when those risks arise from
something besides the component itself.118
The holdings in Walton and Mitchell demonstrate that courts treat
component parts manufacturers and assembled product manufacturers
differently with respect to the third-party duty to warn.119 A component
part might be used with any number of products, and the law generally
does not require a manufacturer to understand the risks of products made
by others and warn against those risks.120 A manufacturer that incorporates
into its product a component made by another company, however, usually
has a responsibility to test and inspect that component.121 Thus, cases
involving component parts often implicate the third-party duty to warn and
highlight the importance of the manufacturer’s level of expertise and
knowledge in the determination of liability.122
3. Replacement Parts
Questions regarding the third-party duty to warn appear in yet another
subsection of products liability law: cases involving replacement parts.123
For example, in Bich v. General Electric Co., an explosion badly burned
the plaintiff while he was replacing the fuses in a malfunctioning General
Electric (GE) transformer.124 The plaintiff replaced the GE fuses with
Westinghouse fuses manufactured three years after GE installed the
transformer at issue.125 Besides being slightly larger in diameter and
manufactured at a later time, the Westinghouse fuses were identical to
their GE counterparts.126 In response to GE’s summary judgment motion,
117. Id.; cf. Schaeffer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062 (Mass. 1977)
(holding that automobile manual should have warned of a foreseeable risk in use
of component part manufactured by defendant).
118. Pantazis v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 87 N.E.3d 1191, 1197 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).
119. See Walton, 610 A.2d at 459–60; Mitchell, 487 N.E.2d at 1375.
120. See KAYE, supra note 68, § 32:9.
121. See Kellett, supra note 110, at 1016.
122. See KAYE, supra note 68, § 32:9.
123. See Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1132–33 (4th Cir.
1986); Bich v. Gen. Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
124. Bich, 614 P.2d at 1325.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1325–28.
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a Washington appellate court considered whether the transformer was
unreasonably dangerous as a result of GE’s failure to warn against the risks
of replacing its fuses with third-party fuses.127 The court found that
whether the transformer was unreasonably dangerous as a result of
inadequate warnings was a question for the jury, as GE may have had a
duty to warn against the dangers of substituting other fuses with its own,
even if it had no duty to warn of the Westinghouse fuses in particular.128
By contrast, in Baughman v. General Motors Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that General Motors (GM)
had no duty to warn against the dangers of using a multi-piece wheel that
replaced the original type of wheel that GM designed for one model of its
trucks.129 During his work as a mechanic, the plaintiff mounted a tire on
the third-party multipiece wheel, and a defect in the product caused the
tire to explode, severely injuring the plaintiff.130 The court explained that
unlike the manufacturer that incorporates a defective component into its
finished product, GM had no opportunity to test and inspect the
replacement part that injured the plaintiff.131 To hold GM accountable for
a defective replacement part would effectively punish a manufacturer for
failing to test the safety of all possible replacement parts for warning
purposes.132 Thus, the third-party duty to warn creates an excessive burden
for manufacturers, and the appropriate duty rests on the manufacturer of
the replacement component part.133
The reasoning behind the disparate holdings from Bich and Baughman
illustrates that courts diverge on what exactly a third-party duty to warn
entails for manufacturers.134 On the one hand is the Bich court’s idea that
a manufacturer could warn against third-party replacement parts in a
general way, without the need to address every possible replacement
option in particular.135 On the other hand is the Baughman court’s point
that a manufacturer cannot sufficiently warn against a risk without
understanding it to some extent through testing.136 Clearly, cases involving
127. Id. at 1328. GE argued that it could not have foreseen that a similar fuse
manufactured by another company three years later might have different
characteristics for which it should have warned. Id.
128. Id.
129. Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1133 (4th Cir. 1986).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id.; Bich v. Gen. Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
135. See Bich, 614 P.2d at 1328.
136. See Baughman, 780 F.2d at 1133.
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replacement parts serve as fertile ground for raising the question of the
third-party duty to warn.137
4. Bare-Metal Products
Finally, the most common products liability context that implicates the
question of a third-party duty to warn is the group of cases involving baremetal products, or products that are made without insulation, packing, or
other material that must be added at a later time to operate properly, and
such material usually contains asbestos.138 Cases involving these baremetal products naturally lend themselves to questions concerning the duty
to warn against risks associated with third-party products because the baremetal manufacturers create products that are paired with a dangerous
material like asbestos, and plaintiffs seek to hold the bare-metal
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of the dangers of inhaling asbestos
fibers.139 Of course, plaintiffs also seek to hold the asbestos manufacturers
liable, but decades of lawsuits have left nearly all asbestos manufacturers
bankrupt.140 Consequently, injured plaintiffs look for recovery from thirdparty manufacturers whose products played some role in the exposure to
asbestos fibers.141
For example, in Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff
worked in a shipyard cleaning supplies and equipment, including
respirator masks manufactured by the defendants and used by other
workers in the yard.142 Through prolonged use, the respirators
accumulated asbestos fibers that the plaintiff inhaled over a period of time
while cleaning the masks, causing him to develop mesothelioma and
die.143 The survivors sought recovery from the respirator manufacturers
137. See, e.g., Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 517 N.E.2d 1304 (N.Y. 1987).
138. See Mark A. Behrens & Margaret Horn, Liability for AsbestosContaining Connected or Replacement Parts Made by Third-Parties: Courts are
Properly Rejecting This Form of Guilt by Association, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
489 (2014). Many of the asbestos cases that involve warning defects are maritime
cases because of the prevalence of asbestos-containing equipment on large ships.
See Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414 (Ct. App. 2009).
139. See, e.g., Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
see also Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www
.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/asbestos/asbestos-fact
-sheet (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9J65-WFYF].
140. Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the “Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real
or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1151–52 (2005).
141. Id.
142. Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wash. 2012).
143. Id.
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for failing to warn of the dangers of the third-party asbestos.144 The
respirator manufacturers filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
that the plaintiff only had a claim against the asbestos manufacturer, as the
asbestos caused the injury, not the respirators.145 The Washington
Supreme Court denied the motion because the respirators inherently
involved the danger of exposure to asbestos when used as intended.146
In another asbestos case, Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., the
plaintiff was a member of the U.S. Navy who worked on an aircraft carrier
repairing equipment, like valves and pumps, that the manufacturers
outfitted with gaskets, packing, or insulation containing asbestos.147 The
valve and pump manufacturers wrapped them in their own asbestos
material before the time of sale, but by the time the plaintiff interacted with
the equipment, workers had replaced the original asbestos with thirdparty-manufactured asbestos.148 After developing mesothelioma, the
plaintiff filed suit and asserted that the valve and pump manufacturers had
a duty to warn of the hazards of repairing equipment laced with asbestos
like theirs.149 The defendants countered that the harm that plaintiff
allegedly suffered was the result of the third-party asbestos manufacturer’s
product, not their pumps, valves, or original asbestos material.150 A
California appellate court found in favor of the equipment manufacturers,
holding that the third-party duty to warn only arises when the
manufacturer’s own product causes or creates the risk of harm when used
in combination with a third-party product.151 In other words, the asbestos
endangered the plaintiff, not the valves or pumps, and therefore the
asbestos manufacturer should bear the burden of warning about its own
product’s risks when used in combination with others.152 The Taylor
court’s reasoning illustrates one view of what it means for a product to
present a risk to consumers—a view that is more restrictive than the
Macias court’s view, as that court determined that respirators intended for

144. Id.
145. Id. at 1079.
146. Id. at 1080.
147. Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414, 418 (Ct. App.
2009).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 419.
150. Id. at 419–20.
151. Id. at 425–26. For an instance where two products combine to each create
a risk such that both manufacturers have a duty to warn, see Ilosky v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603 (W.Va. 1983).
152. Taylor, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 425–26.
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use in environments with asbestos presented a risk of exposure.153 The
Taylor court, by contrast, effectively held that a product does not present
a risk unless it has the physical capacity to cause the injury underlying that
risk, as only the asbestos does in bare-metal cases.154
Many asbestos cases that implicate the third-party duty to warn
involve products that originally contain no asbestos but that another
manufacturer uses with its own asbestos-containing product.155 One such
case is Shields v. Hennessy Industries, Inc.156 In Shields, the plaintiff
worked as a mechanic using the defendant-manufacturer’s brake arcing
machine for grinding brake linings that contained asbestos.157 The court
considered whether the machine manufacturer should be held liable for
failing to warn about the dangers of using its product with third-party
brakeshoe linings.158 Given that the brake arcing machine’s only purpose
was to grind brakeshoe linings that at all relevant times contained asbestos,
the court found that the machine itself contributed substantially to the
asbestos-related harm suffered by the plaintiff and dismissed the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.159
C. State Statutes and the Third-Party Duty to Warn
The third-party duty to warn arises in a variety of products liability
contexts, including cases involving conjoined or integrated products,
component parts, replacement parts, and bare-metal products.160 In cases
implicating the third-party duty to warn, courts must proceed in light of
both their own precedent and state statutes governing products liability
claims.161 These state statutes concerning products liability, however,

153. Macias v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 282 P.3d 1069, 1080 (Wash. 2012).
154. Taylor, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 425–26.
155. See, e.g., Shields v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2012).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 269–70. The purpose of the machine was to grind brake shoes to
match the arc within the brake drums.
158. Id. at 280; see also Bettencourt v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 141 Cal. Rptr.
3d 167 (Dist. Ct. App. 2012). But see Barker v. Hennessy Indus., 141 Cal. Rptr.
3d 616 (Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Thomas v. Borg-Warner Morse TEC LLC, 340 F.
Supp. 3d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2018).
159. Shields, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 281.
160. See discussion supra Part I.B.1–4.
161. See, e.g., Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3CV, 2019 WL 3287067, at *13–20 (Tenn Ct. App. July 22, 2019).

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 243

12/2/20 7:03 AM

240

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

typically fail to address the third-party duty to warn issue in a sufficiently
direct manner to obviate the need for independent judicial analysis.162
For example, a Louisiana state court considering a third-party duty to
warn case would look to the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) for
guidance.163 One relevant portion of the LPLA provides that the
“characteristic of the product that renders it unreasonably
dangerous . . . must exist at the time the product left control of its
manufacturer or result from a reasonably anticipated alteration or
modification of the product.”164 The problem is that both proponents and
opponents of the third-party duty to warn could make a colorable argument
for their side based on this statutory language.165 On the one hand, for
example, if a bare-metal manufacturer reasonably anticipated that another
manufacturer or vendor would modify its product by adding asbestos, then
arguably the above LPLA provision applies to that bare-metal product,
thereby triggering the third-party duty to warn.166 On the other hand, the
asbestos poses the danger to consumers, not the bare-metal product, and
therefore “the product” referred to by the statute—the pump or valve—is
not unreasonably dangerous.167 It is not as if a third-party manufacturer is
altering or modifying the valves such that they become prone to bursting
and injuring users, for instance.168 Hence, the LPLA fails to resolve the
third-party duty to warn issue; such failure is common to other states’
statutes on products liability, too.169 As a result, it is up to the courts to
address the issue.170

162. See generally Products Liability: 50 State Statutory Surveys: Civil Laws:
Torts, 0020 SURVEYS 29 (West 2019).
163. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.51–.60 (2019).
164. Id. § 9:2800.54(C).
165. See generally Tarver v. Wyeth, No. 3-04-2036, 2005 WL 4052382 (W.D.
La. June 27, 2005).
166. See generally Roberts v. Bioplasty, Inc., No. 93-2967, 2000 WL
34487072 (E.D. La. Feb. 11, 2000).
167. See generally Fricke v. Owens-Cornings Fiberglas Corp., 618 So. 2d 473
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
168. See, e.g., Kirschenbaum v. Spraggins, No. 08-4569, 2010 WL 2291455,
at *9 (E.D. La. June 3, 2010).
169. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig., C.A. No. N10C–08–258 ASB, 2012 WL
1415706 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2012); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 373
P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016); Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l, Inc., No. E201701985-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3287067, at *13–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22,
2019).
170. See generally Coffman, 2019 WL 3287067, at *18 (using a jurisprudential
test despite the presence of a Tennessee products-liability statute).
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As the cases involving conjoined use, component parts, replacement
parts, and bare-metal products demonstrate, various factors motivate
courts to decide one way or another on a manufacturer’s duty to warn
against the risks of another manufacturer’s product, such as the nature of
the product at issue, the relationship between the two manufacturers, and
their relationship with the end user or consumer.171 Courts, however, treat
these factors inconsistently, such that no one uniform approach to the
third-party duty to warn has emerged.172
II. THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE THIRD-PARTY DUTY TO
WARN
As courts across the country have grappled with the question of
whether and when a manufacturer is legally obligated to warn about the
risks associated with another party’s products, three main approaches
stand out as the most prevalent: the bare-metal option, the foreseeability
standard, and the middle-ground approach between the two.173 Each of
these positions has its own justifications that are worth understanding in
turn.174
A. The Bare-Metal Approach: No Third-Party Duty to Warn
In the face of plaintiffs alleging a third-party duty to warn, some courts
have adopted the “bare-metal defense,” which provides that manufacturers
are only liable for the harms that their own products cause.175 According
to the bare-metal defense, if a manufacturer did not itself make, sell, or
distribute a product or incorporate a part into its product, then that
manufacturer is not liable for any harm that the product causes.176 The case
cited most often as authority for the bare-metal defense is Lindstrom v. A171. See discussion supra Part I.B.1–4.
172. Compare Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l., Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995) (finding no duty to warn when another product caused harm, even
if the manufacturer recommended using that harmful product), with Rogers v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 701 N.Y.S.2d 359, 359 (App. Div. 2000) (finding a duty
to warn against a third-party, injurious product because the manufacturer knew its
product would be paired with the potentially harmful product).
173. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 993–94 (2019).
174. See discussion infra Part II.A–C.
175. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005);
Evans v. CBS Corp., 230 F. Supp. 3d 397, 403–05 (D. Del. 2017); Cabasug v.
Crane Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1041 (D. Haw. 2013).
176. See, e.g., Lindstrom, 424 F.3d 488; Evans, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 403–05;
Cabasug, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
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C Product Liability Trust.177 During Rolf Lindstrom’s decades of work as
a merchant seaman178 on a number of vessels, he worked on various pieces
of equipment that contained asbestos.179 After developing mesothelioma,
he filed suit against a host of manufacturers whose equipment he had
worked on.180 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
dismissed the bare-metal manufacturers, Coffin Turbo Pump, Inc. and
Ingersoll Rand, on summary judgment because neither company
manufactured the asbestos that allegedly injured Lindstrom.181 The court
reasoned that the plaintiff could not prove the cause-in-fact element of his
claim against these manufacturers in light of the fact that another company
incorporated the asbestos material into their products.182 The justification
for this claim was that Lindstrom could not prove that either
manufacturer’s product was a “substantial factor” in his illness, which is a
prerequisite to proving the element of causation under negligence and
strict liability theories.183 It is impossible, according to the court, for a
product devoid of asbestos to cause an asbestos-related injury like
mesothelioma.184
The next significant endorsement of the bare-metal defense came from
the California Supreme Court in O’Neil v. Crane Co.185 A sailor in the U.S.
Navy who worked in engine and boiler rooms developed mesothelioma
and afterwards sued two valve and pump manufacturers for failing to warn
of the dangers of asbestos.186 Third-party manufacturers were responsible
for adding post-sale the asbestos-containing insulation and gaskets that
allegedly caused the sailor’s illness.187 The court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that manufacturers may be held strictly liable when it is foreseeable
that another party will use their products in conjunction with defective
177. Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 491.
178. The term “seamen” refers to “those workers who face regular exposure
to the perils of the sea.” Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 549
(1997).
179. Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 491.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 496–97.
182. Id. at 497.
183. Id.at 492.
184. See, e.g., Thurmon v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 650 Fed. Appx. 752, 756 (11th Cir.
2016).
185. O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 990 (Cal. 2012).
186. Id.
187. Id. Granted, the manufacturers’ products originally came with asbestoscontaining gaskets and packing, but by the time the plaintiff was exposed to those
products, the original asbestos parts had been replaced with equivalent third-party
ones. Id. at 998.
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products or replacement parts made by a third-party.188 The court
explained that foreseeability alone is not a sufficient basis for potential
liability, and proving that the defendant manufactured the injury-inducing
product is a separate threshold requirement for liability.189
In addition to such legal rationales, the court also acknowledged that
policy considerations largely influenced its decision to reject the strict
liability theory of recovery for breach of the third-party duty to warn.190
Given that one of the policy goals behind the strict liability standard is to
place the costs of injury and deterrence on parties most financially able to
bear them, the court reasoned that imposing liability in this case would
effectively burden one set of manufacturers with the costs of warning
about the risks created by a different set of manufacturers.191 Furthermore,
liability for third-party products would have the effect of forcing
manufacturers to investigate the potential risks of all other products that
others might foreseeably use with their own, which in turn translates to
higher costs for consumers when the manufacturers inevitably have to
cover the expenses of their new research and development focused on
third-party parties.192
Concerning the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim based in negligence,
the court addressed the question of whether the scope of a manufacturer’s
duty to warn included the risks posed by third-party asbestos products.193
The court analyzed the following factors relevant to the determination of
the existence and scope of a duty to warn: (1) the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
(3) the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
injury; (4) the morality behind the defendant’s conduct; (5) the goal of
deterring future harm; (6) the weight of the burden to the defendant and
the impact on the community of imposing a duty to exercise care; and (7)
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.194
The court concluded that these factors did not support a third-party duty
to warn because imposing such a duty would seldom prevent future harm,
as the original manufacturer has no control over subsequent

188. Id. at 990. Under the standard of strict liability, the court explained,
foreseeability is relevant only to determining whether injury is likely to result
from a potential use or misuse of a product. Id. at 1005.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1005–07.
191. Id. at 1005–06.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1006.
194. Id. (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
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manufacturers’ actions.195 The court also reasoned that the third-party duty
to warn could lead to an overabundance of warnings, as more
manufacturers than otherwise would include warnings on products in the
face of a third-party duty to warn.196
The bare-metal approach essentially denies the existence of the thirdparty duty to warn altogether.197 The Lindstrom decision justified this
approach without regard to policy considerations, finding that a plaintiff
who asserts a failure to warn claim against Manufacturer A to recover for
injuries caused by Manufacturer B’s product would be unable to prove the
necessary causation element in his claim against A.198 O’Neil, on the other
hand, substantiated the bare-metal approach with policy considerations
relevant to the strict liability standard and with duty-based concerns under
the negligence standard.199 Not all courts agree, however, that
considerations of causation, duty, or policy weigh in favor of the baremetal defense’s denial of the third-party duty to warn.200
B. The Foreseeability Approach: The Third-Party Duty to Warn
Subsumed by the Generic Duty to Warn
Another approach to the question of whether a manufacturer can be
liable for failing to warn against the dangers presented by third-party
products treats the third-party duty to warn like the generic duty to warn
against dangers latent in the foreseeable uses of one’s own product.201 This
approach mirrors that of the general foreseeability standard that courts
apply in first-party duty to warn cases.202 Recently, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit championed this approach, holding that
manufacturers of bare-metal products are liable for warning defects when
the facts show that the plaintiff’s injuries were a reasonably foreseeable
195. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 1007.
196. Id.
197. See cases cited supra note 175.
198. See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488, 497 (6th Cir. 2005);
see also Thurmon v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 650 Fed. App’x. 752, 756 (11th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he ‘bare metal defense’ is, essentially, a causation argument.”).
199. O’Neil, 266 P.3d at 1005–07.
200. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
201. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232 (3d
Cir. 2017); Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, No. 14-CV-29-SNY-SCW, 2015
WL 5584749 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 035126, 2004 WL 2250990 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004) , abrogated by Air & Liquid Sys.
Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson Co., 373
P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
202. See Chicano, 2004 WL 2250990.
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result of the manufacturer’s failure to warn.203 The court justified its
holding by exploring the doctrinal roots of the bare-metal defense.204 The
court found that some authorities understand the defense in terms of the
causation element of negligence or strict liability theories, as in Lindstrom,
while other courts think in terms of the question of duty and its scope, as
in O’Neil.205 The Third Circuit reconciled these perspectives in its
determination that the heart of the bare-metal defense is foreseeability.206
In other words, a reasonable interpretation of the bare-metal defense is that
the defense serves as a bright-line rule in which injuries caused by thirdparty products are presumedly unforeseeable to another manufacturer,
while the foreseeability approach views such injuries as sometimes
foreseeable and sometimes not, depending on the facts at hand.207 In an
attempt to articulate a standard applicable to bare-metal cases, the Third
Circuit held that the foreseeability requirement is met if a bare-metal
manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known, at the time it placed
its product into the stream of commerce, that
(1) asbestos is hazardous, and
(2) its product will be used with an asbestos-containing part,
because
(a) the product was originally equipped with an asbestos
containing part that could reasonably be expected to be replaced
over the product’s lifetime,
(b) the manufacturer specifically directed that the product be used
with an asbestos-containing part, or
(c) the product required an asbestos-containing part to function
properly.208
The Third Circuit identified three sufficient conditions—(a), (b), and
(c)—for the third-party duty to warn, because under each of those
conditions, it would be foreseeable that a plaintiff might suffer asbestosrelated injury as a result of the manufacturer’s failure to warn.209 Given the
fact-specific nature of the foreseeability approach, however, these above
three conditions are not the only ones from which liability might arise, and
203. In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d at 241.
204. Id. at 236.
205. Id.; see also text accompanying note 71.
206. Id. Insofar as foreseeability relates to both duty and proximate cause, the
court found merit in both competing views. Id.
207. Id. at 236–37.
208. Id. at 240.
209. Id.
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therefore the answer to the question of whether a manufacturer has a thirdparty duty to warn varies on a case-by-case basis.210
Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC provides a good illustration of how
the foreseeability approach might work in an asbestos context.211 Kochera
involved a sailor who contracted asbestosis after sweeping the dusty floors
around GE turbines located in the engine room on a U.S. Navy ship.212
When the turbines left GE’s control, they did not have any heat insulation
materials installed, and GE was uninvolved in the subsequent process of
supplying and installing asbestos-containing heat insulation materials.213
The plaintiff countered that GE was aware of its turbines’ use in high-heat
environments like engine rooms, meaning it knew the machines needed
some kind of heat insulation material.214 Indeed, the blueprints for the
turbines called for insulation and packing.215 The court denied GE’s
motion for summary judgment because it was foreseeable that the turbines
would subject those working around them to the risks of asbestos
exposure.216
Kochera underscores the fact-specific, case-by-case nature of the
foreseeability approach because arguably none of the three conditions
developed by the Third Circuit would have been met in the case, and yet
the court still upheld the possibility of liability.217 That is, GE did not equip
its machines with asbestos to begin with, it directed the use of some kind
of heat insulation material but not necessarily asbestos-laden material, and
the machines did not require insulation containing asbestos to function so
long as other insulation devoid of asbestos was available.218 Despite the
absence of these factors, the court determined that the risk of exposure to
asbestos was still foreseeable, presumably because asbestos was the go-to
material in such industrial settings.
210. Id. The difference between this foreseeability approach and the
conditional-duty approach discussed infra Part II.C is subtle. See Dandridge v.
Crane Co., No. 2:12-cv-00484-DCN, 2016 WL 319938 (D. S.C. Jan. 27, 2016).
211. Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, Case No. 14-CV-29-SMY-SCW, 2015
WL 5584749 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015).
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *4.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *1; In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 240
(3d Cir. 2017). As previously stated, (a), (b), and (c) mentioned by the Third
Circuit were just three sufficient conditions of foreseeability, not necessary
conditions. In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d at 240.
218. Kochera, 2015 WL 5584749, at *1.
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Thus, the foreseeability standard and the bare-metal defense sit on
opposite ends of the spectrum of judicial approaches to the third-party duty
to warn.219 The main difference between these approaches centers around
how the bare-metal defense limits the universe of risks that must be
warned against to only those risks arising from the foreseeable uses of a
manufacturer’s own product, not the products of third-parties.220 By
contrast, the foreseeability approach expands that universe to include
foreseeable hazards posed by third-party products used in conjunction
with one’s own product.221 There is, however, another view of the thirdparty duty to warn that defines a group of risks as potential triggers of the
duty to warn that is larger than the bare-metal defense’s definition but
smaller than the foreseeability approach’s counterpart.222
C. The Middle-Ground Approach: A Conditional Duty to Warn about
Third-Party Products
1. DeVries and the Maritime Context
In its recent decision Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, the
United States Supreme Court endorsed a middle-ground approach to the
third-party duty to warn in the maritime context, leaving unresolved the
question of the proper approach in non-maritime settings.223 Kenneth
McAfee and John DeVries were two members of the U.S. Navy, who
219. See discussion supra Part II.A–B.
220. See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 993 (2019).
221. See, e.g., id.
222. See discussion infra Part II.C. Other courts have offered similar middleground approaches before DeVries. See Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F.
Supp. 3d 760, 769–70 (N.D. Ill. 2014); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d
458, 474 (N.Y. 2016). In Quirin, for example, the court endorsed a rule that
imposed a third-party duty to warn where the use of asbestos-containing materials
was specified by a defendant, was essential to the proper functioning of the
defendant’s product, or was for some other reason so inevitable that by supplying
the product, the defendant was responsible for introducing asbestos into the
environment at issue. Quirin, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769–70; see also Dandridge v.
Crane Co., No. 2:12-cv-00484-DCN, 2016 WL 319938 (D. S.C. Jan. 27, 2016).
Similarly, in In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation, the court held that the manufacturer
of a product has a duty to warn of the risks arising from the known and reasonably
foreseeable uses of its products in combination with a third-party product which
is necessary to enable the manufacturer’s product to function as intended as a
matter of design, mechanics, or economic necessity. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig.,
59 N.E.3d at 474.
223. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991.
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worked on ships outfitted with pumps, blowers, and turbines requiring
asbestos insulation or asbestos parts to properly function.224 The
manufacturers of the pumps and blowers did not always add the asbestos
parts to their own products.225 Instead, they delivered the equipment “baremetal” such that a third-party manufacturer had to outfit the equipment
with asbestos to function as intended.226 The Navy later incorporated thirdparty asbestos parts into the bare-metal manufacturer’s products.227
McAfee and DeVries claimed that they ingested asbestos because the
manufacturer’s equipment caused asbestos fibers to disperse through the
air they inhaled on the Navy ships, allegedly causing the plaintiffs to
develop cancer and later die during the course of the litigation.228 The
plaintiffs chose to sue the bare-metal manufacturers in particular because
the Navy was immune from liability under Feres v. United States,229 and
the manufacturers of the asbestos parts were bankrupt.230 The plaintiffs
argued that the bare-metal manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn
of the dangers of the asbestos that they knew would be incorporated into
their products.231 After the plaintiffs sued in the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia, the defendant-manufacturers removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under
federal maritime jurisdiction.232
The district court granted the manufacturers’ motions for summary
judgment based on the bare-metal defense, as the defendant-manufacturers
did not make the asbestos that allegedly injured McAfee and DeVries, only
the pumps and valves to which the injurious asbestos attached.233 On
appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the district court’s application of the
bare-metal defense, applying instead the foreseeability approach discussed

224. Id. After Kenneth and John’s deaths, their widows Roberta G. DeVries
and Shirley McAfee became plaintiffs. Id. See also Asbestos Exposure and
Cancer Risk, supra note 139.
225. See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 991–92.
229. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres created a sovereignimmunity protection that prevents active-duty servicemembers from asserting tort
claims against the United States for injuries arising out of military service. Id. at
146.
230. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 992.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. DeVries v. Gen. Elec. Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458–59 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
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above.234 The Third Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion, prompting the manufacturers to appeal.235
The Supreme Court rejected both the district court’s bare-metal
defense approach and the Third Circuit’s foreseeability approach, opting
instead for a maritime-specific rule that provides as follows:
a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product
requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be
dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no
reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that
danger.236
Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, marshalled a number of
policy considerations in support of this new approach.237 First, the product
manufacturer will usually be in a better position than the parts
manufacturer to warn of the danger of an integrated product, as
manufacturers might use a part in any number of ways with a variety of
products, whereas companies usually design a product with a specific use
in mind.238 Second, manufacturers already have a duty to warn about their
own products, so adding a small number of additional warnings should not
meaningfully increase the burden on a select few manufacturers.239
Finally, the special solicitude for sailors that motivated the Third Circuit
also reinforced the Supreme Court’s middle-ground approach.240
234. In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir.
2017).
235. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 986.
236. Id. at 996. Some commentators are calling this the “required
incorporation standard.” Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries – Post-Decision
SCOTUScast, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Sept. 14, 2019), https://fedsoc.org/comment
ary/podcasts/air-liquid-systems-corp-v-devries-post-decision-scotuscast [https://
perma.cc/KW66-6YWZ].
237. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994–96.
238. Id. at 994.
239. Id. at 995.
240. Id. As one authority puts it, “Seamen are wards of admiralty whose rights
federal courts are duty-bound to jealously protect. In view of the nature of their
services and its accompanying dangers, and the special circumstances attending
their calling, seamen occupy a position as wards or favorites of admiralty.” 78A
C.J.S. Seamen § 9 (2020), Westlaw. Despite the persuasive weight afforded to the
solicitude to sailors in DeVries, the same Court held in another case that the
solicitude doctrine has “only a small role to play in contemporary maritime law.”
Dutra Grp. v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (2019).

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 253

12/2/20 7:03 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

250

[Vol. 81

Joined by Justices Alito and Thomas, Justice Gorsuch authored a
spirited dissent, which claimed that expecting one manufacturer to warn
about another manufacturer’s risks dilutes the incentives behind the duty
to warn.241 Justice Gorsuch also praised the simplicity and clarity of the
bare-metal defense, along with its resonance with consumer expectations,
as people do not expect, for example, to read warnings about the dangers
of undercooked meat when buying a new set of kitchen knives.242 Finally,
Justice Gorsuch concluded with a silver lining: Justice Kavanaugh cabined
the DeVries standard to maritime contexts only, and thus courts operating
outside that context are free to adopt the more sensible bare-metal defense
going forward.243
2. Non-Maritime Contexts
Although DeVries resolved the issue of the proper judicial approach
to the third-party duty to warn in maritime contexts, in non-maritime areas
the decision merely recommended a third option for courts to consider,
apart from the bare-metal defense and foreseeability approach.244 Unlike
the bare-metal defense that precludes all liability for Manufacturer A
failing to warn against Manufacturer B’s product, the rule outlined in
DeVries allows for Manufacturer A to be liable for failing to warn against
Manufacturer B’s product under certain circumstances.245 In contrast to
the foreseeability standard, however, DeVries establishes a threshold
requirement for breach of the third-party duty to warn that demands more
than foreseeability alone.246 Thus, the DeVries standard is a middle-ground
approach, as it envisions more recovery than the bare-metal defense but
less than the foreseeability alternative.247
Therefore, courts faced with non-maritime cases in which a plaintiff
seeks recovery from one manufacturer for failing to warn against the
dangers of another manufacturer’s product have at least three viable
options to choose from—the bare-metal defense, the foreseeability
approach, or a middle-ground alternative.248 Although there is

241. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 996–97 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 998 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1000 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
244. See, e.g., Coffman v. Armstrong Int’l., Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3CV, 2019 WL 3287067, at *13–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2019).
245. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See, e.g., Coffman, 2019 WL 3287067, at *13–20.
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considerable authority behind each option, a careful consideration of the
merits and demerits of each approach singles one out as ideal.249
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A CONDITIONAL THIRD-PARTY DUTY TO
WARN
Courts in non-maritime contexts ought to adopt a conditional duty250
approach, similar to the one endorsed in DeVries.251 The conditional duty
approach avoids the downsides of the other approaches yet also retains
many of their benefits.252 The bare-metal and foreseeability approaches
both produce unfair, inefficient results in certain circumstances, and fair,
efficient outcomes in others.253
A. The Bare-Metal Defense: Less Than Bare-Minimum Relief
The bare-metal defense overlooks the essential similarity between the
manufacturer that releases a product that is itself dangerous and the
manufacturer that creates either a safe, unfinished product that will be
dangerous in its finished form or a product that consumers will inevitably
use with a dangerous one.254 Consider, for example, the bare-metal
products at issue in DeVries or the brake arcing machine from Shields.255
The pumps and valves manufactured by Air and Liquid Systems
Corporation in DeVries required asbestos materials like insulation to
function as intended, and therefore the company essentially created an
incomplete product that would inevitably become dangerous in its finished
state.256 Therefore, Air and Liquid Systems is arguably just as responsible
for introducing the asbestos into plaintiff’s environment as the third-party
asbestos manufacturer.257 The bare-metal defense would shield Air and
249. See discussion infra Part III.
250. A conditional duty is “[a] duty that is conditioned on the occurrence of
an event other than the lapse of time.” Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019), Westlaw.
251. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995.
252. See generally Chesher v. 3M Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 693, 708 (D. S.C.
2017) (finding that policy considerations stack up most favorably behind a
middle-ground approach such as the standard developed in Quirin v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co.).
253. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 991; Shields v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Ct.
App. 2012).
256. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991.
257. See id. at 994.
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Liquid Systems from liability simply because the company did not
integrate its product with the necessary asbestos parts, despite its
knowledge that, based on the nature of its product, some third-party would
perform the integration anyway.258
Similarly, the bare-metal defense as applied in the Shields case would
preclude liability for the manufacturer of the brake arcing machine that is
specifically designed for use with asbestos-filled brakes because the
asbestos, not the machine, causes injury to the machine’s users.259 The
manufacturer of such a machine, however, occupies an analogous position
as the manufacturer of the asbestos-filled brakes, as both manufacturers
know that the use of their products involves a risk of harm from
asbestos.260 This risk accompanies the use of the product regardless of the
source.261 Given that the source of the risk is dispositive of liability under
the bare-metal defense, however, courts that have adopted the defense treat
the manufacturers differently despite their analogous positions.262
In addition to being unfair, the bare-metal defense clashes with the
well-established principle of products liability that a manufacturer is
responsible for incorporating a defective part into its own product.263
Under some circumstances it makes no difference for liability purposes
that the source of the harm to the product’s user is a part created by a thirdparty manufacturer, as Walton—where the helicopter manufacturer
incorporated a defective engine into its product—illustrates.264 Granted,
bare-metal advocates might distinguish cases like Walton on the ground
that there the manufacturer that failed to warn also integrated the defective
part into its product, unlike in DeVries.265 Nevertheless, it is intolerable for
a manufacturer to create a product that requires incorporation before use
and then escape liability when someone else does the incorporation.266
Rather than fixate on the actor who accomplishes the integration,
258. See Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 769 (N.D. Ill.
2014); Salisbury v. Asbestos Corp., Case No. 12-03260, 2014 WL 345214 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 29, 2014).
259. See Shields, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268.
260. See Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. 15-6394, 2016 WL
5780104 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016).
261. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991; Shields, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268.
262. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994.
263. See Kellett, supra note 110, at 1016; Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454
(Pa. 1992).
264. See Walton, 610 A.2d at 458.
265. See, e.g., Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 517 N.E.2d 1304, 1305
(N.Y. 1987).
266. See id.
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conjunction, or replacement, courts ought to hitch the possibility of
liability to the parties responsible for exposing consumers to the risk of
injury.267 In the context of bare-metal cases like DeVries, for instance,
responsibility for injury no doubt rests, in part, with the asbestos makers.268
Arguably, however, responsibility also lies with the bare-metal
manufacturers, as many of those companies created an opportunity for the
conjoined use of their pumps and valves that only asbestos manufacturers
could take advantage of.269
Moreover, from a public policy standpoint, the arguments marshalled
in favor of the bare-metal defense do not withstand scrutiny.270 For
instance, one argument allegedly favoring the bare-metal defense is that
without it, the third-party duty to warn forces manufacturers to incur costs
studying the risks of other manufacturers’ products in an effort to warn
against them, and manufacturers would pass those higher costs on to
consumers as companies increase their prices to shoulder the new
burden.271 The extra liability that manufacturers face as a result of a thirdparty duty to warn promises to drive up prices even further as
manufacturers try to recoup the added costs of more warnings and
litigation.272 The worry is that the higher cost of products outprices a
greater proportion of consumers, leading to fewer sales overall, which
means fewer manufacturers stay afloat in the tighter market, and as a
result, there is less innovation on the whole from manufacturers.273 As
Justice Gorsuch noted in DeVries, “[W]hen we effectively require
manufacturers of safe products to subsidize those who make more
dangerous items, we promise to raise the price and restrict the output of
socially productive products.”274

267. See generally Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 769
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (couching the middle-ground approach to the third-party duty to
warn in terms of whether the defendant was responsible for introducing asbestos
into the environment).
268. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1000 n.5 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
269. See generally Golanski, supra note 24, at 81 (noting that manufacturers
in bare-metal cases usually know that the type of insulation that is most likely to
be used alongside their products contained asbestos).
270. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1005–06 (Cal. 2012).
271. See id.
272. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1470–71 (2010).
273. See id.; see also Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 999 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
274. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 999 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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This argument fails to appreciate that the decrease in accidents and
injuries as a result of the third-party duty to warn has the potential to offset
the increased costs of goods that consumers face.275 While a third-party
duty to warn would increase prices in certain cases, the absence of a thirdparty duty to warn means that accident costs are higher in some cases
too.276 Consider, for example, the plaintiffs from DeVries.277 Without a
third-party duty to warn, McAfee, DeVries, and their survivors had no
chance at recovery, since the asbestos manufacturer in question was
bankrupt and the Navy was immune from liability under Supreme Court
precedent.278 With no hope of recovery, the sailors and their families
would bear the brunt of the pecuniary damages of medical expenses, lost
wages, and income diminution, not to mention the nonpecuniary losses.279
Such crippling costs on tort victims are likely to have a deterrent effect on
innovation and safety that is similar to the effect of increased prices from
extra warnings, as uncompensated consumers have less money to spend
on goods that keep manufacturers in business than compensated ones.280
Even uninjured consumers, especially the risk-averse ones, may choose to
forego the purchase of a product here or there out of fear of injury for
which there is no recovery. While it is hard to say without empirical data
whether one set of costs—either from increased warnings or from the
absence of recovery for certain victims—outweighs the other, it is clear
that the advantages manufacturers stand to gain under the bare-metal
approach are not without their downside.281
Another questionable argument in support of the bare-metal defense
is that requiring one manufacturer to warn against another manufacturer’s
products runs afoul of the well-known principle that tort liability should
fall on the party who is able to prevent accidents at the least cost, a party

275. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for
Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1934–36 (2010).
276. See generally id. (noting that one of the most important effects of
products liability law is the provision of compensation to injured individuals).
277. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991.
278. See id. at 992.
279. First-party insurance may cover some of the pecuniary costs of accidents
on injured victims, but there is no guarantee that the majority of victims have such
first-party insurance or that the payments adequately compensate injured
individuals. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 275, at 1935.
280. See id.
281. See id.
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known as the “cheapest cost avoider.”282 The reason a third-party duty to
warn might violate this principle is that manufacturers with superior
knowledge of their own products face minimal information costs283
associated with product warnings, whereas no such knowledge exists as to
third-party products.284 By virtue of the expertise over its own product, a
manufacturer naturally stands in the best position to decide whether the
risks that its product poses to the public cost more or less than the price of
warning against them.285 By contrast, the third-party duty to warn asks
manufacturers to make such a calculation about other company’s products
with which they may have no familiarity. The information costs associated
with learning enough about a third-party product to adequately warn
against its risks are bound to be higher than the costs of doing so for one’s
own products, and as a result, it is unlikely that one manufacturer is the
cheapest cost avoider as to the accidents caused by another manufacturer’s
products.286 Instead, each manufacturer most cheaply minimizes accident
costs from injuries caused by its own products, not third-party products.
Therefore, insofar as the bare-metal defense allows manufacturers to
ignore the accident costs of other products for warning purposes, the
defense avoids a liability scheme under the third-party duty to warn that
ineffectively allocates liability.287
The problem with this policy-oriented defense of the bare-metal rule
is that in many cases a manufacturer need not incur any extra information
costs to learn about the risks of a third-party product because it is clear
from the nature of its own product or from other circumstances that those
risks will be present.288 For example, in DeVries or Shields, the
manufacturers had no doubt that their products would be used in
conjunction with asbestos products, and thus the risks associated with such
conjoined use were not hidden such that the manufacturers had to expend
282. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 311–18
(1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
283. “The costs of correcting false and inaccurate information and obtaining
additional accurate and complete information are called information costs.”
Stephen Trzcinski, The Economics of Redlining: A Classical Liberal Analysis 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1993).
284. See Golanski, supra note 24, at 90.
285. See id.
286. See generally Lindley J. Branza, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic
Loss Doctrine, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 277, 292 (1987) (“Information asymmetries
and high information costs are important market defects . . . .”).
287. See O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1005–06 (Cal. 2012).
288. See Golanski, supra note 24, at 91.
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costs to discover them.289 In cases where there is a close connection
between the products, each manufacturer will likely possess similar levels
of knowledge and expertise about the products, meaning there is no
significant disparity in information costs incurred as a result of a thirdparty duty to warn.290
One such connection is when Manufacturer A creates a product that
cannot function without Manufacturer B’s product, as in that case the
profitability of A’s product is directly tied to B’s.291 This financial
connection between the products incentivizes A to understand B’s product
well enough to make reasonable decisions such as whether to alter its
product so as to no longer require B’s to function.292 Given this increased
knowledge of B’s product, A has naturally minimized the information
costs associated with warning against B’s product, and hence the two
manufacturers are similarly-situated cost avoiders. Furthermore,
manufacturers like A receive an economic benefit from the sale of thirdparty products because their own products could not function without the
third-party products.293 As a result, it is not altogether unfair to hold one
manufacturer liable for failing to warn against the risks of another
manufacturer’s product.
From both fairness and policy perspectives, the bare-metal defense is
deficient.294 It is unfair to distinguish between the manufacturer that
releases a product that is itself dangerous and the manufacturer that creates
a safe, unfinished product that will be dangerous in its finished form.295
Similarly, there is little daylight between a product that is dangerous on its
own and a product that consumers will inevitably use with a dangerous

289. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 991 (2019);
Shields v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Ct. App. 2012).
290. See Golanski, supra note 24, at 91.
291. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 1443–44.
292. See generally id. (listing examples of businesses that suffered substantial
market losses as a result of the public learning of dangers associated with their
products). Such a decision might be reasonable in light of trends forcing B’s
product out of the market, for instance.
293. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 474 (N.Y.
2016) (observing that when a manufacturer produces a product that requires
another product to function, that manufacturer creates a market for that third-party
part or product).
294. See generally Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., No. 15-6394, 2016
WL 5780104 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016) (rejecting the bare-metal defense in favor of
an alternative approach).
295. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 994 (2019).
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one given its nature or the present market circumstances.296 Despite the
essential similarity between such manufacturers and products, the baremetal defense differentiates between them. The defense also inefficiently
allocates liability because it precludes recovery in circumstances in which
there would be no added information costs for one manufacturer to be
potentially liable for failing to warn against the risks of a third-party
manufacturer’s product.297 Therefore, the ideal standard for the third-party
duty to warn in non-maritime contexts lies in an alternative approach,
either the foreseeability or conditional duty options.298
B. The Foreseeability Approach: Visibly Excessive
The foreseeability approach exhibits downsides just as the bare-metal
defense does but for a different reason.299 That is, the approach produces
unfair results and inefficiently allocates liability in many cases, but not
because it is too conservative with the possibility of liability like the baremetal defense.300 Instead, the foreseeability approach is too liberal with
liability. One way to see why the approach allows too many opportunities
for recovery from manufacturers is to compare it to the principle of
products liability known as the “components parts doctrine.”301 This
doctrine states that manufacturers of component parts are not liable for
harms caused by the products into which their components are integrated
unless either the component itself is defective and its defect causes the
harm, or the component manufacturer substantially participates in the
296. See id. Arguably the latter manufacturer mentioned above creates a
dangerous product also, only the product is not yet dangerous when it leaves the
manufacturer’s hands but will become so in use.
297. See Golanski, supra note 24, at 91.
298. See discussion supra Part II.B&C. Of course, courts are free to adopt an
approach besides the three general options considered here. See Coffman v.
Armstrong Int’l, Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3287067, at *19
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2019) (rejecting the bare-metal defense, the
foreseeability approach, and the standard outlined in DeVries). Given the
prevalence of the three considered here, however, it is reasonable to expect courts
to prioritize them for consideration and only favor an alternative in the event all
three are unacceptable for whatever reason. See id.
299. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994 (characterizing
the downsides to the foreseeability approach).
300. See generally Henderson, supra note 97, at 613–18 (comparing a
foreseeability approach to enterprise liability).
301. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998); Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co., 28
Cal. Rptr. 3d 744, 746 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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integration of the component into the finished product that causes the
harm.302 As the Restatement (Third) explains, it would be “unjust and
inefficient” to impose liability on the component parts manufacturer solely
because the manufacturer of the integrated product used the component in
such a way as to render the finished product dangerous.303
Any number of manufacturers might utilize a component part in
various ways and for different purposes, and therefore liability for the
component manufacturers would be unjust because they would bear the
impossible burden of effectively warning against every foreseeably risky
way their parts might be utilized.304 Without the component parts doctrine,
a part might need to come with 20 different warnings to cover the 20
unique contexts in which it might function, even though any particular user
would only benefit from just one of those warnings. Liability for
component parts manufacturers would also be inefficient because such
manufacturers would have to investigate how other manufacturers plan to
use their components in integrated products, even though the law already
charges the manufacturer of the finished product with responsibility to the
end user.305 Thus, the components parts doctrine protects parts
manufacturers from unjust and inefficient liability.306
These same arguments that weigh in favor of the component parts
doctrine based on the desirability of a fair and efficient liability scheme
militate against the foreseeability approach.307 Just as manufacturers or
consumers might utilize component parts in various ways and in
connection with a diverse group of products, a finished product might
foreseeably be used alongside multifarious third-party products.308 One of
the reasons component parts manufacturers stand in a less-than-ideal
position to warn about a finished product is because parts are usually
versatile enough to function in more settings than the manufacturer could
feasibly warn against.309 The same will hold true for finished products as
well because of their compatibility with either a wide variety of different
302. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998); Tellez-Cordova, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 746.
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1998).
304. Id. § 5 cmt. d.
305. Id. § 5 cmt. a.
306. See Id.§ 5 cmt. a, d.
307. See generally Henderson, supra note 97, at 612–13 (marshalling the
components-parts doctrine to argue against a third-party duty to warn).
308. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1998).
309. Id.
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products or a range of different types of the same product.310 The Goodyear
tire at issue in Rastelli, for instance, was compatible with 24 different
models of multipiece rims, and therefore the foreseeability approach could
require 24 different warnings on one type of tire in order to address every
foreseeable risk.311 Similar to the component parts context, Goodyear’s
liability for failure to meet such a stringent duty to warn is both unjust
because of the infeasibility of warning against manifold risks and
inefficient because of the extra expenses incurred from learning enough
about various third-party products to adequately warn against them.312 The
law spares manufacturers of component parts from an onerous liability
scheme in failure-to-warn cases, but the foreseeability approach would
saddle product manufacturers with such an unjust, inefficient scheme.313
Furthermore, the warnings that the foreseeability approach would
mandate may do more harm than good in certain instances.314 For example,
under the foreseeability approach, the foreseeable danger of Manufacturer
B’s product that is used merely occasionally with Manufacturer A’s
product imposes a third-party duty to warn on A, regardless of the
overwhelming amount of alternative, perfectly safe contexts in which A’s
product might function in combination with others.315 The result is that
A’s product would require a warning that is irrelevant in more settings
than not—a result that reveals the prospect of wasted resources under the
foreseeability approach. Additionally, B must still warn of its own
products, and as a result consumers using A and B’s products together
would encounter two warnings as to the same risk, leading to concerns
with consistency and overwarning.316 Knowing less than B about its own
310. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 994
(2019) (acknowledging that lots of products can be used in various ways with lots
of other products and parts).
311. See Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 223 n.1
(N.Y. 1992).
312. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. a, d
(AM. LAW INST. 1998).
313. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994 (rejecting the
foreseeability approach because of its alleged uncertainty and unfairness).
314. See generally Henderson, supra note 97, at 615–16 (warning of the
slippery slope of requiring warnings in all cases where the risk of the third-party
product is merely foreseeable).
315. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232 (3d
Cir. 2017); Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, No. 14-CV-29-SNY-SCW, 2015
WL 5584749 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 035126, 2004 WL 2250990 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson
Co., 373 P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
316. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 994.
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product, A may create a warning that contradicts B’s warning, leaving
consumers more confused than protected. Risk-averse consumers may
incorrectly assume that A’s product is unsafe based on its warning, and
when faced with A and B’s products in combination, those same
consumers may glaze over the warnings altogether.317 Too many warnings
that may be inconsistent with one another make consumers less safe, and
therefore in many cases the foreseeability approach will fail to increase
overall product safety.318
Additionally, the foreseeability approach unfairly allocates liability in
many cases.319 It fails to distinguish between a manufacturer like
Goodyear, which created a tire compatible with 24 multipiece rims, and a
manufacturer like Air and Liquid Systems, which produced bare-metal
products compatible with only one third-party product, asbestos
insulation.320 Under the foreseeability approach, Air and Liquid Systems
would certainly have a third-party duty to warn, as the nature of its own
product makes the risk of asbestos exposure inevitable, much less
foreseeable.321 Assuming the risks associated with the compatible
multipiece rims are sufficiently well-known, Goodyear would also owe a
third-party duty to warn to consumers according to the foreseeability
approach.322 Goodyear, however, is arguably less responsible than Air and
Liquid Systems for subjecting consumers to the dangers of a third-party
product because the vast majority of rims that were compatible with
Goodyear’s tires were perfectly safe, whereas asbestos was the only
product compatible with Air and Liquid Systems’s pumps. Rather than
creating an opportunity for the conjoined use of two products that only
manufacturers of dangerous products could capitalize on—as Air and
Liquid Systems did—Goodyear made opportunities available to a range of
manufacturers, only some of which created defective products.323 Fairness
317. See generally id. (expressing concern over the possibility of overwarning
under the foreseeability approach).
318. See generally Henderson, supra note 97, at 616–17 (arguing that users
and consumers of safe products end up subsidizing dangerous products under a
liability scheme premised on the third-party duty to warn).
319. See id. at 613.
320. See Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 223 n.1
(N.Y. 1992); Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 988.
321. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995–96 (holding that
a product per se requires incorporation of a part when one of a number of
conditions are met, including when the product would be useless without the part).
322. See Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d 222.
323. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 474 (N.Y.
2016) (observing that when a manufacturer makes a product that requires another
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dictates that courts distinguish between these two types of cases, but the
foreseeability approach treats them similarly.
One might object that it is inconsistent to characterize a bare-metal
manufacturer like Air and Liquid Systems as partly responsible for
introducing the risk of third-party asbestos to its consumers and yet to
reject such a characterization of Goodyear with respect to the dangers of
multipiece rim defects.324 Such a distinction, however, is not inconsistent
because it is inevitable that a consumer would use Air and Liquid Systems’
product in conjunction with a dangerous third-party product, whereas it is
possible but not guaranteed that users would pair Goodyear’s tires with a
defective rim.325 The inevitability of the conjunction of the two products
ensures that Air and Liquid Systems knew of the risk of asbestos exposure
and therefore stood in an analogous position as the manufacturer of the
hazardous product with respect to the ability to warn.326 By contrast,
Goodyear may not have known of the particular defect in question, but the
foreseeability standard nevertheless treats the two manufacturers as
potentially liable, despite their disparate levels of familiarity with the risks
posed by the relevant third-party products.327
Moreover, the foreseeability approach fails to further the policy goal
of imposing liability on the cheapest cost avoider when dealing with
manufacturers that create products compatible for use with a variety of
third-party products, such as Goodyear in the Rastelli case.328 For
example, the information costs Goodyear would incur to be capable of
adequately warning against multipiece rim defects are high, yet the
foreseeability approach demands Goodyear incur those costs to protect
itself from failure-to-warn liability.329 When the risks of a third-party
product necessarily accompany the use of a manufacturer’s product,
however, the information costs of a third-party warning lessen
accordingly, as the manufacturer is more than likely familiar with products
product to function, that manufacturer creates a market for that third-party part or
product).
324. See generally Golanski, supra note 24, at 80.
325. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991.
326. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 471 (considering
whether a manufacturer is in a superior position to know of and warn against
hazards as relevant to the question of a third-party duty to warn).
327. See generally Schwartz v. Abex Corp., 106 F. Supp. 3d 626, 658 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (rejecting the foreseeability standard on similar grounds).
328. See CALABRESI, supra note 282, at 311–18; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra
note 282; see Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 223 n.1
(N.Y. 1992).
329. See generally Behrens & Horn, supra note 138, at 511.
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that must be used with its own.330 Furthermore, a manufacturer like
Goodyear likely derived little economic benefit from the sale of defective
multipiece rims, as there were 24 compatible types of rims available, only
some of which were defective.331 Unlike Hennessy or Air and Liquid
Systems that effectively had to patronize the market around a dangerous
third-party product by creating products that could not function without
that market, Goodyear may have believed it was patronizing a safe corner
of the market of multipiece rims despite the foreseeable defects in other
corners of that same market.332
These downsides to the foreseeability approach indicate that the ideal
trigger for the third-party duty to warn requires a closer connection than
mere compatibility between products.333 The manufacturer of a product
that could function alongside a variety of third-party products is akin to
the component manufacturer that creates a part that could work in a host
of finished products.334 Accordingly, the component parts doctrine
recognizes that component manufacturers share too tenuous of a
connection with product manufacturers to be responsible for the risks of
their finished products, but the foreseeability approach overlooks this key
insight.335 Thus, the ideal standard for a third-party duty to warn is one that
will incorporate the rationale at the heart of the component parts doctrine
and require some closer connection between products than mere
compatibility.336
C. The Inevitability Standard: Bound to Be Right
Given that the downsides to the foreseeability approach weigh in favor
of a rule limiting liability in cases involving the third-party duty to warn
and that the downsides to the bare-metal defense weigh in favor of a rule
330. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 282, at 311–18; Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 282.
331. See Rastelli, 591 N.E.2d at 223 n.1.
332. See generally Henderson, supra note 97, at 615–18.
333. See generally Spencer v. Ford Motor Co., 367 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985) (declining to hold car manufacturer Ford liable for its
compatibility with a defective component part).
334. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
5 cmt. a, d (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
335. See generally In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232
(3d Cir. 2017); Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, No. 14-CV-29-SNY-SCW, 2015
WL 5584749 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ.A. 035126, 2004 WL 2250990 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A.W. Chesterson
Co., 373 P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
336. See infra Part III.C.
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allowing liability in such cases, the ideal approach is one along the lines
of the middle-ground standard set forth in DeVries.337 More specifically,
courts ought to define a manufacturer’s duty to warn against the risks of
third-party products in non-maritime contexts as follows:
A product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (1) its product
will inevitably be used together with a third-party part or product
such that the conjoined use cannot be avoided as a result of the
product’s design, the manufacturer’s instructions, or the absence
of economically feasible alternative means of enabling the product
to function as intended; (2) the product manufacturer knows or
should know that the intended combined use of the products is
likely to be dangerous; and (3) the product manufacturer knows or
should know that the product’s users will not anticipate that
danger.338
This particular conditional duty approach departs from the “required
incorporation” standard of DeVries in significant ways and is
appropriately titled the “inevitability standard.”339
1. Condition 1: Inevitability
Under the above standard, inevitability arises in three different
ways.340 First, for example, if the defective multipiece rim used with
Goodyear’s tire in Rastelli was the only economically feasible option of
the 24 compatible rims, then it would be inevitable that consumers would
use the tire and defective rim together as a result of businesses acting
rationally in the face of market forces, and accordingly Goodyear would
satisfy the first condition above.341 Second, if Goodyear were to instruct
consumers to use its tires with the particular defective multipiece rim at
issue in the case, then it is reasonable to assume that users will heed such
337. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 995 (2019). The
duty is conditional because it only exists if a manufacturer’s product requires
incorporation of a part, the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the
integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the
manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that
danger.
338. See generally Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760 (N.D.
Ill. 2014); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458 (N.Y. 2016).
339. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 996.
340. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 474.
341. See generally id.
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instructions, and the conjoined use of the products would be inevitable.342
Finally, if Goodyear designed its tires such that they could not be used
without the defective rim at issue, then such conjoined use is inevitable.343
The condition of inevitability ensures that the standard furthers the
goals of fairness and efficient allocation of liability in ways that the baremetal and foreseeability approaches could not.344 For instance, unlike the
bare-metal defense, the inevitability standard appropriately recognizes the
essential equivalence between manufacturers that create a product that is
dangerous in itself and manufacturers that create either an unfinished
product that will inevitably become dangerous when finished or a product
that cannot be used without a defective one.345 Under the inevitability
standard, the latter two types of manufacturers cannot circumvent liability
just because either their own products do not physically cause injury, or
they do not incorporate the dangerous third-party product into their own.346
Unlike the bare-metal defense, the inevitability standard aptly holds
manufacturers accountable when they create products that unavoidably
accompany dangerous third-party products.
By the same token, the inevitability requirement ensures that the
pendulum of liability does not swing too far in the other direction like the
foreseeability approach.347 The requirement of inevitability precludes
liability for breach of the third-party duty to warn in cases where a
manufacturer creates a product that is merely compatible for use with a
host of third-party products, as it is only possible—but not inevitable—
that the products might function together.348 Granted, in Rastelli, for
example, it may seem inevitable that a consumer would choose to use a
342. See 2 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 5, at § 11:20 n.28.
343. See generally Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, Case No. 14-CV-29SMY-SCW, 2015 WL 5584749, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015) (acknowledging
that a manufacturer should not necessarily escape liability when it designs a
product that must function alongside asbestos-containing materials).
344. See generally Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760 (N.D.
Ill. 2014); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458.
345. See generally Dandridge v. Crane Co., No. 2:12-cv-00484-DCN, 2016
WL 319938 (D. S.C. Jan. 27, 2016).
346. See, e.g., DeVries v. Gen. Elec. Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458–59 (E.D.
Pa. 2016).
347. See generally In re Asbestos Products Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232
(3d Cir. 2017); Kochera, 2015 WL 5584749; Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No.
Civ.A. 03-5126, 2004 WL 2250990 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie v. A.W.
Chesterson Co., 373 P.3d 150 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
348. See, e.g., Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 223
n.1 (N.Y. 1992).
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defective multipiece rim with Goodyear’s tire, even though both products
were merely compatible with one another.349 The apparent inevitability of
the combination of the two products is a byproduct of the benefit of
hindsight. At the moment Goodyear released its tire into the stream of
commerce, there was no guarantee it would be utilized alongside the
particular multipiece rim in question, and therefore it was not inevitable
that the two products would be used together under the above standard.350
In between the inevitable use of two products and the mere foreseeable
use of them there exists a range of probabilities—everything from highly
unlikely though still foreseeable, to highly likely but not necessarily
inevitable.351 The inevitability standard errs on the side of caution in
rejecting as a trigger for the third-party duty to warn anything less than the
clear certitude of inevitability from the perspective of the manufacturer at
the time its product enters the stream of commerce.352 This choice has the
advantage of avoiding an unclear liability scheme for manufacturers that
leaves them uncertain of whether their products are sufficiently likely to
be used with a third-party product as to generate a third-party duty to
warn.353 Under the foreseeability standard, that likelihood may be so
unclear that most manufacturers play it safe and provide third-party
warnings where they are not necessary, leading to instances of waste,
inconsistency, and overwarning.354
The next advantage of an inevitability requirement is that in all three
of the situations in which the conjoined use of the products is inevitable,
it is reasonable to expect that both manufacturers are efficient cost
349. See id.
350. Of course, if causal determinists are right that “every event is necessitated
by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature,” then every
conjunction of products is inevitable because everything is inevitable. See Carl
Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stan
ford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-causal/ (last updated Jan. 21,
2016) [https://perma.cc/L5JF-4VFK]. Insofar as the inevitability standard looks
from the perspective of the manufacturer at the moment it releases its product into
the stream of commerce; however, it remains agnostic as to whether causal
determinism is true.
351. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–40, Air & Liquid Sys.
Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019) (No. 17-1104) (discussing the different
percentages of likelihood that two products might be used together).
352. See generally Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760 (N.D.
Ill. 2014); May v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 129 A.3d 984 (Md. 2015); In re N.Y.C.
Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458 (N.Y. 2016).
353. See Henderson, supra note 97, at 615–16.
354. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 989–
90 (2019).
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avoiders, as they both know their products will be used together and
therefore possess similar levels of knowledge about the products.355 Even
if some manufacturers must incur information costs to familiarize
themselves with the intricacies of another product’s risks, those costs are
bound to be significantly lower under the inevitability standard than under
the foreseeability standard, given the fewer number of products that will
inevitably be used together compared to those that could foreseeably be
used together.356
Additionally, a standard of inevitability is less ambiguous than the first
“required” condition of DeVries.357 It is unclear when exactly a third-party
product is required for incorporation.358 For instance, even if a third-party
product is the only economically feasible option to be used alongside
another product, then arguably that third-party product is not required for
incorporation because other options, though not economically feasible, do
exist. Similarly, if a manufacturer recommends a product for use alongside
its own but alternatives exist, then the recommended product is not strictly
speaking required.359 By contrast, the inevitability requirement avoids
such ambiguity because if no economically feasible alternatives exist or if
one product is recommended, then from the perspective of the
manufacturer the conjoined use is virtually guaranteed, or inevitable.
2. Condition 2: Actual or Presumed Knowledge of Danger
The second condition of the inevitability standard mirrors the DeVries
standard, but it better accords with the first condition of inevitability than
with the requirement condition of DeVries.360 In cases where it is
inevitable that two products will be used together, it is reasonable to expect
a manufacturer to know of the other product and be appropriately attentive
355. See Golanski, supra note 24, at 91.
356. See generally Schwartz v. Abex Corp., 106 F. Supp. 3d 626, 657 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (acknowledging that the universe of foreseeable risks could be greater
than the universe of known risks).
357. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 996 (“(i) its product requires
incorporation of a part . . . .”).
358. See generally id. at 998 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (raising concerns over
the meaning of “required” in the majority’s standard).
359. See, e.g., Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l., Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1995) (a dialysis machine manufacturer recommends formaldehyde as a
cleaner).
360. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 996 (“(i) its product requires
incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the
integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses . . . .”).
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to its features, as the profit prospects of its own product are tied to that
third-party product.361 For example, if the third-party manufacturer
becomes embroiled in headline-inducing products liability litigation, then
the manufacturer whose product is inevitably used in conjunction with the
third-party’s is likely to feel the effects of the expected drop in sales.362
Under the DeVries standard, however, there are likely to be cases where a
manufacturer certainly knows of the danger of a third-party product used
in concert with its own, but that third-party product is not required, and
therefore the third-party duty to warn is not triggered.363 If the knowledge
of the third-party product’s risk is significant, as both the DeVries and
inevitability standards suggest, then one would expect more situations in
which such knowledge is present to satisfy the other conditions of the
standard as well.364
3. Condition 3: Actual or Presumed Knowledge of Anticipation of
Danger
Finally, the third condition of the inevitability standard departs from
DeVries by triggering the third-party duty to warn when the manufacturer
knows or should have known that the intended users of the products will
not anticipate the danger of the conjoined use of the products, rather than
conditioning the duty on the manufacturer’s lack of any reason to believe
that the users would realize that danger.365 A requirement of actual or
presumed knowledge is ideal because it allows courts to consider which
361. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 1443 (discussing the
incentives to reduce product risk generated by market forces). Contra Goldberg
& Zipursky, supra note 275; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Skeptical
Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (2010).
362. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 272, at 1443 n.13.
363. See, e.g., Shields v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2012). Arguably, the brake arcing machine from Shields could have
worked with brake linings that did not contain asbestos, but all of the linings in
operation at the time when retailers sold the arcing machine had asbestos in them.
364. Granted, there may be instances under the inevitability standard when a
manufacturer knows of some risk from conjoined use of its products with another
manufacturer’s but such use is not inevitable, meaning the third-party duty to warn
is not triggered.
365. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995 (“(i) its product requires
incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the
integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the
manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize that
danger.”).
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manufacturer stood in the better position to warn and whether one
manufacturer should have known of the ineffectiveness of another
manufacturer’s warning.366 For instance, when one manufacturer’s
product is a durable item that will withstand wear and tear over long
periods of time—in contrast to, for instance, an asbestos manufacturer
whose product deteriorates relatively quickly and must be replaced—the
former manufacturer stands in a better position to warn than the latter.367
The asbestos manufacturer’s warning is likely to wear away over time, and
when users repair or interact with the pumps or valves that contain
asbestos, they are more likely to look for warnings in the instruction
manuals that accompany the bare-metal products than anywhere else.368
Thus, under the inevitability standard, an ineffective warning from an
asbestos manufacturer does not let a manufacturer like Air and Liquid
Systems off the hook for liability, as the latter manufacturer would not
know or have reason to know that users of its pumps or valves would
anticipate the danger of asbestos exposure in that case.369 In fact, if the
asbestos warning is likely to function ineffectively because of
deterioration or misplacement, then the bare-metal manufacturer has
reason to know that the users would not anticipate any danger, and
accordingly the third-party duty to warn arises.
Under the DeVries standard, however, a bare-metal manufacturer like
Air and Liquid Systems could use an asbestos manufacturer’s warning as
justification for its belief that the users of the pumps and valves would
realize the danger of asbestos exposure.370 In that case, the manufacturer
would have some reason, albeit a very weak one, to “believe that the
product’s users will realize” the hazards of inhaling asbestos fibers, and
therefore the third-party duty to warn would not arise.371 This result reveals
the problem with conditioning the third-party duty to warn on the absence
of any reason to believe that users will anticipate the danger in question as
Justice Kavanaugh did.372 Given the first-party duty of manufacturers to
warn about the risks of their own products, every manufacturer will always
366. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 472 (N.Y. 2016)
(considering whether a manufacturer is in a superior position to know of and warn
against hazards as relevant to the question of a third-party duty to warn).
367. See id.
368. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Effective
Communication of Warnings in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working with
Industrial Materials, 73 MO. L. REV. 1, 37 (2008).
369. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 472.
370. See generally Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995.
371. See generally id.
372. See generally id.
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have at least one reason to believe that users will realize the danger of
using another product with their own—namely, the other manufacturer’s
warning as to its own product.373 Under this interpretation, Justice
Kavanaugh’s third condition would effectively undercut the entire
DeVries standard, meaning there must be more to the question of whether
a manufacturer has “no reason” or some reason to believe that the
product’s users will realize the danger in question.374 Nevertheless, it
remains unclear what exactly is missing.375
Rather than speculate as to what constitutes no reason or some reason,
the inevitability standard improves upon DeVries’s third condition by
using the typical negligence language of “knew or should have known”
with respect to whether users would anticipate a danger in the product.376
This affords manufacturers and courts alike with the benefit of certainty,
as both understand such language to impose the same standard of
reasonable care that applies to the duty to warn about one’s own
products.377 If, as DeVries implies, a reason to believe that users will
realize a product’s danger precludes a third-party duty to warn, then
manufacturers may justifiably wonder whether that reason must be a
convincing one or not.378 The inevitability standard avoids such confusion
by trafficking in the familiar standard of reasonable care.
The requirement of reasonable care in the third condition of the
inevitability standard also incentivizes manufacturers to consider whether
they stand in a better position than another manufacturer when it comes to
warning about the risks of a third-party product that will inevitably be used
with their own.379 Some manufacturers, like the asbestos maker discussed
above, face practical difficulties with warning because of the nature of
their product.380 In that case, the bare-metal manufacturer likely knows
that the asbestos material is not conducive to conveying an effective
warning to workers.381 Instead of hiding behind another manufacturer’s
373. See generally id. at 999 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a
manufacturer’s expectation that another manufacturer will comply with its own
duty to warn is sufficient reason to believe that users will realize the danger).
374. See generally id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
375. See generally id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
376. See MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 46, at § 1.03.
377. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 388 (AM. LAW INST.
1965) (“(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied . . . .”).
378. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 995.
379. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d 458, 472 (N.Y. 2016).
380. See generally Schwartz & Appel, supra note 368, at 37.
381. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 59 N.E.3d at 472.
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warning as Justice Kavanaugh’s standard allows, manufacturers faced
with the above third condition must determine whether a court is likely to
find that they had enough information to know that another manufacturer’s
warning would be ineffective, leaving end users unaware of the danger at
hand. Thus, the inevitability standard ensures that the manufacturer in the
better position to issue the third-party warning does so.382
CONCLUSION
DeVries brought the issue of the third-party duty to warn to the fore,
spurring courts to speculate as to the proper non-maritime tort rule
regarding a manufacturer’s duty to warn about the dangers of a third-party
product.383 In fashioning such a rule, courts have a complex, often
contradictory body of case law to draw from, as well as a host of
competing policy considerations that can be difficult to reconcile with one
another.384 More importantly, the stakes are high, as tort rules can have
significant impacts on the prices of goods that consumers purchase on a
daily basis.385
The inevitability standard yields consistently fair, efficient results for
both manufacturers and injured consumers alike. Unlike the bare-metal
defense, the inevitability standard properly treats as equals manufacturers
who create inherently dangerous products and those that create unfinished
products that will become dangerous when finished. Furthermore, unlike
the foreseeability approach, the inevitability standard protects
manufacturers from liability for hazards that they are not responsible for
introducing into the stream of commerce and that they cannot efficiently
protect against.386 When faced with the competing jurisprudential and
policy considerations that attend the third-party duty to warn, courts ought
to adopt the inevitability standard.

382. See generally id.
383. See Yaw v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., CASE NO. C18-5405 BHS, 2019
WL 1755299, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2019) (deferring consideration of
defendant-manufacturers’ motions for summary judgment until after filing
supplemental briefing on how DeVries may impact causation and the failure-towarn analysis); Bradley, supra note 15 (“But the reasoning underlying the
[DeVries] decision is persuasive for cases that are land-based as well.”).
384. See cases cited supra notes 12–14.
385. See generally Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic
Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses,
Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 255 (2013).
386. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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